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Executive Summary 
 
 The newly emerged local governance structures and the 
social norms and dynamics they have imposed at the sub-
national level in Syria have played a major role in shaping 
the Syrian conflict. However, these structures have been 
marginalised in the internationally-backed pre-agreement 
negotiation processes, which will impede the 
implementation of any political solution and will inevitably 
weaken its legitimacy at the local level. 
 
 Given the increasing international and regional 
consideration to the reconstruction of Syria, the exclusion 
of these local structures, which are best suited to 
represent the needs of their local communities, 
will weaken the inclusiveness and relevancy of any 
reconstruction attempt in the future. 
 
 Therefore, the adaptation of a combined top-down and 
bottom-up approach to the political solution would 
facilitate the implementation of any political 
arrangements between the warring parties and would 
arguably support legitimising such arrangements at the 
national and sub-national level. 
 
 However, the current administrative and legal 
frameworks which regulate the electoral processes and 
the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the 
Central Government and the Local Administrative 
Councils (LACs) have largely failed to develop an actual 
vision of decentralisation.  
 
 The pseudo-decentralised approach envisioned in the 
Syrian laws; namely the Law of General Elections (Law 
No. 5 for 2014) and the Law of Local Administration (Law 
No. 107 for 2011), has proven to be ineffective and unable 
to gain the required social acceptance. 
 
 There is a general impression that Law 107 is a quantum 
leap in terms of decentralisation, and that it has 
fundamental differences from what has been previously 
implemented, namely Law No. 15 for 1971. However, the 
new law is nothing more than a superficial facelift of what 
has been the practice of managing Syria’s local affairs for 
the past 40 years. 
 
 The Local Administration Law in Syria does not give any 
real powers to the elected local councils. Most of the real 
powers are still concentrated in the hands of the 
Damascus-appointed Governors, who preside over 
elected councils and enjoy almost absolute powers over 
their provinces at all administrative levels with a judicial 
immunity granted by the law. In addition to the total 
absence of any effective measures to impose 
transparency, accountability and public participation. 
 
 Most of the essential functions in the sectors of health, 
education, agriculture, service delivery, resource 
management and local revenue management are still 




 Theoretically, the newly issued Law of General Elections 
(Law No. 5 for 2014) has managed to introduce relatively 
new political concepts to Syria’s socio-political scene to 
be more consistent with the constitutional amendments 
made in 2012, especially the abolition of Eighth Article of 
the Constitution of 1973, which states that the al-Baath 
party is the leader of the state and society. The law 
allowed the participation of non-Baathist political parties 
in local elections and opened the way for wider popular 
participation in these elections. 
 
 In reality, however, the law still suffers from many 
fundamental problems that will ultimately prevent the 
holding of representative, free and fair local elections. 
Such as: 
 
- The absence of voting rights for IDPs, refugees and 
the Syrian diaspora 
- The total absence of any mechanisms to ensure 
women's representation at the local level 
- The unjust administrative division of Syria’s 
administrative units 
- The lack of integrity of Syria’s official judicial 
institutions that supervise and manage the elections, 
and the lack of public confidence in the capabilities of 
these institutions 
- The absence of real powers and tangible impact of the 
elected local councils, which in turn has created a 
negative public perception towards these local 
structures, which considers them as nothing more 
than empty facades to the al-Baath-led security and 
intelligence branches 
 
 In order for the political solution to have any real effect 
over the Syrian conflict, these laws (the laws of local 
elections and the laws of local administration) must be 
modified in order to enable the local governance 
structures to play an influential role in rehabilitating the 
local communities, ensuring a broad public participation, 
promoting the social cohesion, mitigating the effects of 
war economy, stabilising the local economies and 
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1 Introduction 
The reality of the current Syrian conflict and its regional 
and international impact necessitates that any future 
political and negotiated solution must take into account 
the local complexities of this widespread conflict in all 
Syrian territory. Such localised and diverse complexities 
are usually not factored in the political agreements of 
countries emerging from civil wars, and they are often 
marginalised in the pre-agreement political negotiations. 
This impede the implementation of any agreement 
between the warring parties. The Syrian situation is no 
exception. 
 
The local dynamics of the ongoing conflict and its newly 
emerged social norms and governance systems have 
played a major role in defining, shaping and directing this 
conflict on the ground. It has created a new socio-political 
identity of the Syrian state. Therefore, these localities 
must be one of the primary carriers of any future 
agreement. The isolation and marginalisation of these 
local dynamics will have catastrophic consequences, 
especially with regard to the reconstruction phase and the 
restoration of the deeply fragmented social structures in 
Syria.  
 
In reality, most of the relevant agreements that have 
recently taken place in Syria were agreements of a local 
nature, where local communities and their post-uprising 
established administrative structures were the main 
negotiators/implementers of such agreements. These 
local agreements alone are insufficient to end the 
ongoing war in Syria today, especially in the absence of a 
comprehensive political solution at the national level. 
However, they have been able, albeit temporarily, to 
ensure the minimum level of stability that may allow a 
longer-term solution in the future. 
 
We argue that the adaptation of a combined approach of 
top-down and bottom-up approach to the political 
solution would facilitate the implementation of any 
political arrangements between the warring parties. The 
first step towards achieving this is the rehabilitation of 
local communities through the creation of administrative 
and legal frameworks that allow them to be represented 
at the national and sub-national levels thus giving 
legitimacy to the desired political agreement. The most 
applicable way to approach that goal is the careful 
planning of free, fair, transparent and representative Local 
Elections with clear legal frameworks that guarantee 
judicial and social accountability (Lopez-Pintor, 2005).  
  
Post-agreement local elections in Syria can be seen as a 
crucial stabilisation method across all sectors. At societal 
level, ensuring broad public participation in these 
elections, including an emphasis on the right of women to 
be nominated and to vote, would promotes social 
cohesion, reduces tensions among neighbouring 
communities and contributes to the empowerment of 
social harmony. Furthermore, after the constant waves of 
internal, external and forced displacements and 
demographic changes in all Syrian regions, and after 
these IDPs have been stripped of most of their rights; 
local elections are an essential method of restoring their 
dignity and empowering them within their host 
communities, as well as being a substantial incentive for 
these IDPs and refugees to return to their areas of origin 
(Shujaat, 2016). More on this issue in Section 5.2 and 5.3.  
 
Structurally and institutionally, the Local Administrative 
Councils (LACs) in the areas controlled by the Syrian 
government have not witnessed any actual local elections 
since the beginning of 2011. Consequently, most of these 
councils continue to function in accordance with 
outdated decrees that no longer reflect the public 
aspirations for decentralisation. As for areas outside the 
control of the Syrian government; namely the opposition-
held areas, and despite the formation of LACs with 
structures similar to those located in government areas, 
these councils, however, are often formed in an arbitrarily 
way and have largely failed to represent their local 
communities through proper electoral processes. Their 
role was limited to provide basic services of an 
emergency nature without creating a tangible long-term 
impact on the decentralised administrative structure of 
the state. In the PYD-controlled areas, although there is a 
higher level of decentralisation in comparison to the rest 
of the Syrian regions, the local governance bodies that 
were formed in those areas were also not elected 
democratically, and their decision and sovereignty are at 
the disposal of the military forces controlling these areas. 
More on these topics in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.  
“…local elections would play a pivotal 
role as a tool for institutional capacity 
building and developing the social 
capital” 
 
Therefore, in this case, local elections would play a pivotal 
role as a tool for institutional capacity building and 
developing the social capital (Jokay, 2001). Especially if 
these elections are based on solid legal bases, expressed 
technically and legally in a modified law of local 
administration that reflects a clear definition of 
decentralisation, by increasing the roles and powers of all 
administrative units, while reduces the powers of the 
central authority and its Damascus-appointed 
representatives, like governors and district managers. 
These issues are discussed in more details in Section 2 
and Section 5.6.  
 
Moreover, for local elections to be successful it is also 
crucial to understand what constitute legitimacy at the 
local level. What is it that would make people feel that the 
system and the candidates are legitimate? Without 
understanding this aspect and take it into consideration, 
even the best designed local elections law and the best 
run elections would not succeed in constructing 
legitimacy from the bottom up, and would not gain 
peoples’ trust and participation. In this paper we focus 
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mainly on the procedural element of local elections. In 
subsequent publications within the framework of the 
Conflict Research Programme, the question of 
substantive legitimacy in Syria will be explored.   
 
Another important aspect of local elections is the political 
economy of these elections which dictates the strategic 
interactions between state institutions and key economic 
and political players at the national and sub-national level, 
in addition to the role of Governors and the intelligence 
branches in the exploitation of the political economy of 
local elections for the sake of creating and empowering 
localised patronage networks, which, in turn, have a 
significant impact on the constitutes and the entire 
electoral process. Nonetheless, the political economy of 
local elections is not part of this paper’s scope of work 
which mainly focuses on the legal and social implications 
of the current Syrian laws. 
 
2 The Evolution of Syria’s Local 
Administration Laws:  
 
The local administration modalities in Syria have passed 
through two major benchmarks; the 1971 law of local 
administration; Legislative Decree No.15 for 1971, and 
the modified version of that law, the Legislative Decree 
No. 107 for 2011, or what is commonly known as "the law 
107". Both of these laws reflected significant changes in 
Syria's political climate at a particular time. The first law 
was issued shortly after Hafez al-Assad had risen to 
power in 1970, whereas the latter, "modernised" version 
of the law, was presented within a package of attempted 
political reforms by Bashar al-Assad as a response to 
Syria's growing protest movement.   
 
Both of these laws, despite the considerable time interval 
between them, are principally linked with each other. 
Therefore, any attempt to analyse the current laws of 
local elections, namely Law No. 5 for 2014, without 
shedding a light on the Law of Local Administration, Law 
No. 107 for 2011, which had laid the foundation for most 
of Syria’s local governance structures and approaches, 
would be short-sighted and incomprehensive.  
 
In the following sections, we’ll highlight the most 
important aspects of Syria’s Law of Local Administration 
(Law 107), in an attempt to measure its progress, 
investigate its weaknesses and conclude practical 
recommendations that could hopefully improve the 
functions and deepen the impact of any possible post-
agreement local elections.  
2.1 The Legislative Decree No. 15 (1971): 
 
For almost 40 years, Syria’s local administrative affairs 
were regulated within the framework of the Local 
                                                     
1 Legislative Decree No. 15 for 1971: https://goo.gl/r87bFn 
(Last accessed on March, 15th, 2018). 
Administration Law - legislative decree no. 15 date 
11/5/1971, modified by law no. 12/19711. This law was 
designed and developed by the Regional Command of al-
Ba’ath Party, Syria’s ruling political party, to increase its 
limited presence in the country’s peripheries and to reflect 
Hafez al-Assad’s attempt in decentralizing Ba’athist 
centralised apparatus after his “Corrective Movement” of 
1970, by focusing on institution-building and increasing 
the level of administrative delegation from the central 
government to the subnational administrative units.  
 
The law focused on the division of roles and 
responsibilities between the Central Authorities and the 
Local Administrative Units (councils). In addition to the 
geographical distribution, internal structures, chains of 
command, sources of funding, accountability measures 
and the electoral procedures of these councils. 
 
The decentralised framework envisaged in the previous 
local administration decree was largely restricted by the 
state’s excessive centralised nature and the 
overwhelming dominance of security agencies and al-
Ba’ath localised branches. Decision-making power for 
political, security, judicial, and budgetary affairs remained 
centralised in Damascus (Khaddour, 2017).  
 
Vital sectors like education, health, agriculture, industry, 
local resources and revenue management were 
developed, implemented and managed by the relevant 
ministries in Damascus. Moreover, almost all of the 
crucial delegated responsibilities were concentrated with 
the hands of Provincial Councils (PCs), and more 
specifically: Damascus-appointed Governors. PCs were 
given political, sociocultural and environmental activities 
including all big projects (dams, waste 
management…etc.), as well as a direct and strict financial 
and administrative management role over of all 
administrative units within the governorate’s border. They 
also enjoyed a margin of shared responsibilities with the 
relevant ministries including services and activities which 
affect areas and populations inside and outside cities and 
villages.  
2.2 The Legislative Decree No. 107 (2011): 
 
Shortly after Bashar al-Assad was elected president 
through a popular referendum held in 2000, a serious 
reform programme was planned with both developmental 
and political dimensions. The political aspect of this 
reform was suspended, whereas, a gradual and non-
comprehensive reform was implemented in certain 
economic and public administration aspects, by 
expanding the private sector, reforming public sector and 
increasing economic openness and international 
integration. (Hinnebusch, 2012). As a result, the UN and 
other international agencies started to gradually gain a 
more obvious role in developing institutional capacities of 
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the public sector, in collaboration and under strict 
observation from state institutions.  
Syria's Tenth Five-Year Plan (2006-10) has set out a 
framework for transformation, entailing a new social 
contract between the state, the private sector and civil 
society. It also outlined significant reforms to eliminate 
the state monopolies, improve the efficiency of public 
services and civil servants, in addition to enabling civil 
society to make meaningful contributions to policy 
making and monitoring the performance of public 
officials. 
Around the same time, a new law of local administration 
began to be drafted, aiming to address the main gaps of 
the previous one while reflecting the transformative 
reforms listed in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. On 2011, 
following Syria’s protest movement, the Legislative 
Decree No. 107 was issued as one of the many political 
reforms’ attempts to “democratise” the country and to 
enhance the legitimacy of its institutions.  
Theoretically, the new legislative decree, law 107, 
introduced some major changes in comparison to the 
decree no. 15 (1971). It presented modern concepts and 
terminologies, relatively new to the previous Syrian 
regulations, like the notions of "decentralisation", 
"democracy" and "civil society", which were largely absent 
from its older version. The Ba'athist tone was 
considerably less obvious; for example, the elected 
councillors are not obliged anymore to swear an oath to 
"fulfil the goals of the al-Ba'ath party in unity, freedom and 
socialism”. Additionally, a multiparty local election 
system was introduced in association with the newly 
issued law for Political Parties, Legislative Decree No.100 
for 2011, which allowed the establishment of political 
parties and granted them with the right of participation 
and representation in all forms of elections.  
“…the appointed Governors are still 
in possession of almost ultimate 
powers over the lower administrative 
units while enjoying a high level of 
legal impunity against public 
accountability and legal prosecution.” 
The law also intended to provide LACs with more 
decision-making power over most of the state sectors, 
including education, health, industry, private investments 
and revenue management, while transforming most of 
these services from the central ministries to the local 
                                                     
2 Villages and rural units (mentioned in the decree no.15 (1971)) 
were combined into Townships 
3 Law 107. Article 7 
authorities. The guardianship of PCs over their lower 
administrative units was slightly reduced. Additional 
budgetary and financial responsibilities were granted to 
local councils. And, finally, social accountability was 
better defined with additional transparency and 
participatory measures. 
In practice, however, the actual changes and 
modifications in dealing with local structures remained 
marginal. The amended roles and responsibilities were 
duplicative and ambiguous. Security, legislative and 
judicial powers continued to be centrally controlled by the 
government. Moreover, the appointed Governors are still 
in possession of almost ultimate powers over the lower 
administrative units while enjoying a high level of legal 
impunity against public accountability and legal 
prosecution. 
2.3 Syria’s Administrative Divisions: 
Law 107 has divided Syria into four main administrative 
units, instead of five in the older version. These units are: 
Governorates (Provinces), Cities, Towns and Townships2. 
All of these units have legal personalities and financial 
and administrative independence3.  
Similar to its 1971 predecessor; Syria’s administrative 
divisions were distributed according to the local 
population. However, due to the population growth in 
Syria since 1971, the population distribution over the 
administrative units has slightly increased; A City is 
defined as: “every governorate’s centre or unit or 
population group which exceeds 50,000 people”. A Town 
is any unit with a total population larger than 10,000 and 
less than 50,000 people, A Township is between 5,000 
and 10,0004. The establishment, naming and the 
determination of population of all administrative units at 
all layers are done through a separate law5.  
The main source of population data to determine the 
administrative divisions is based on the Civil Registry 
Records of each unit, which is provided from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics. Therefore, administrative units' 
distributions and the regulations of local elections for that 
matter do not include permanent residents of these units, 
unless these residents have previously changed their 
original Civil Registry records (al-nufus) to the unit they 
are currently residing in.  
2.4 Roles and Responsibilities:  
 
The law aims at granting more power over vast sectors to 
the elected local councils, in order to increase their 
legitimacy amongst their local communities and to give 
them the upper hand with all local affairs related to 
4 Law 107. Article 1 
5 Law 107. Article 14 
7          Local Elections in Post-Agreement in Syria, December 2018  
service provision by “implementing the decentralisation 
of powers and responsibilities and concentrating them in 
the hands of the people from different social statuses, in 
accordance with the principle of democracy … Establish 
Administrative Units capable of planning, executing, and 
applying the development plans pertaining to local 
society and implementing related projects effectively and 
efficiently”. Central government’s responsibilities were 
relatively reduced compared to the older version; “The 
role of the central authorities shall be limited to planning, 
enactment, organisation, and supply of modern technical 
methods and implementing major projects which the 
Administrative Units are unable to implement”6.  
The law also granted Governors with a legal immunity for 
their actions during service; only the Supreme Judicial 
Council has the authority to persecute the Governor and 
only after he is transferred to it by a presidential decree. 
Public or civil actions could not be taken against him 
except by decision from the Supreme Judicial Council7. 
Law 107 also indicated that the representatives of 
Governors at the lower administrative levels are not the 
elected City, Town or Township councils, but rather the 
Districts/Sub-Districts appointed managers. These 
managers have a security mandate to oversee public 
security and to establish public order and are appointed 
by the Minister of Interior, based on a recommendation of 
the Governor, and with a direct reporting line to him8. 
3 Syrian Law of General Elections  
(Law No. 5 for 2014): 
 
The political reforms that followed the uprising of 2011 
did not stop at changing the law of local administration, 
they went further to introduce several attempts to 
improve and democratise Syria’s public sphere, mainly by 
allowing new and non-traditional political parties – 
parties which were not part of al-Ba’ath-led National 
Progressive Front- to legally participate in the political 
arena. This newly established political space came as a 
result of the fundamental amendments and 
modifications to the old Syrian constitution, the 1973 
constitution, where the modified constitution, the 2012 
constitution, abolished the paragraph that granted al-
Ba’ath Party the right to a political monopoly over all 
aspects of the Syrian state and society.  
 
Removing al-Ba’ath status as “the ruling party of the state 
and society” and replacing it with constitutional articles 
allowing the alternation of power between other political 
actors, in addition to the consequent promulgation of a 
law regulating the work of the political parties in Syria 
(Law No. 100 for 2011), paved the way for amending the 
general elections law in Syria, by allowing these parties to 
                                                     
6 Law 107. Article 2 
7 Law 107. Article 56 
8 Law 107. Article 78 
enter the elections at all levels; legislative, presidential 
and local. 
3.1   Electoral Divisions:  
According to the Law of General Elections (Law No. 5 for 
2014), LACs’ elections are carried out on the basis of 
Electoral Districts. The number of Electoral Districts is 
based on Syria’s administrative divisions and is 
proportional to the population of each of these 
divisions/units. 
The number of Electoral Districts for Provincial Councils, 
Provincial centre cities, and cities whose population 
exceeds 100,000 people, is determined by a decision from 
the Minister of Local Administration. As for the rest of 
administrative units; each unit is considered a single 
Electoral District9. 
Each District shall elect a number of Candidates 
equivalent to the number of seats allocated to it. The 
number of seats for the councils of the administrative 
units is determined by a decision from the Minister of 
Local Administration in accordance with the percentages 
specified in the Local Administration Law10.  
LACs’ members shall be composed of representatives 
from the following two sectors: 
1. Workers and Farmers. (Sector A) 
2. All remaining categories of people. (Sector B) 
The proportion of representatives from (Sector A) shall be 
at least 50% of all elected members of Local Councils 
(across all Electoral Districts). And the number of 
members allocated for each sector is determined by a 
decision from the Minister of Local Administration with 
regards to each Electoral District11.  
3.2   Electoral Committees 
 
The law tried, on theory, to empower the principle of the 
rule of law over local elections and to raise the level of 
judicial accountability and legal monitoring over the 
electoral processes throughout the formation of several 
bodies of a legal nature that oversees elections at all 
administrative levels. The following is a general 
explanation of these bodies, their powers and their 
association with each other: 
The High Judicial Committee for Elections: A judicial 
committee composed of seven members named by the 
High Judicial Council (which is headed by the President) 
from among the counsellors of the Court of Cassation. 
The High Committee is responsible for full monitoring 
9 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 26: 1,3. 
10 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 26: 2,4. 
11 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 24 and 25. 
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and supervision of Local and Parliamentary elections and 
has the mandate to undertake all necessary procedures 
to ensure the freedom, safety, integrity and transparency 
of these elections12. 
Branch Committee: A tripartite judicial committee of 
appeals judges, formed by the High Judicial Committee in 
every Governorate. This Committee is responsible for: 
 Determining the Election Centres in each Electoral District 
in coordination with the Governor. 
 Supervising election results received from Election 
Centres. 
 Deciding on appeals submitted to it by the Nomination 
Committees and the Election Centre Committees13.  
Nomination Committee: A tripartite judicial committee 
from judges of the Court of First Instance, named by the 
High Committee in every Electoral District. Its main 
responsibilities are:  
 Examining Nomination applications and announcing the 
names of those whose nomination has been accepted 
 Confirming the sector to which the Candidate belongs14. 
Election Centre Committee: shall be formed from three 
members by a decision from the Governor in every 
Election Centre from among civilian state employees in 
order to manage the Election Centre, administer the 
voting process in the Centre, Count the votes, announce 
the results and prepare ballot records and submit them to 
the Branch Committee15. 
3.3   Candidates and Voters Registration 
Candidates and constituents could only exercise their 
right to vote or to stand as candidates in the Electoral 
District where their Electoral Locality is based, i.e. the 
location of their Civil Registry records.  
Eligible voters are registered in The General Electoral 
Register which is prepared by the Ministry of the Interior 
in coordination with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry 
of Local Administration and the Central Bureau of 
Statistics. The High Judicial Committee must confirm 
that the General Electoral Register is precise and up-to-
date at least two months before any electoral process. 
(Art. 27, 28 and 29). 
The General Electoral Register does not include 
permanent residents who are living in an area which is 
different from the area where their original place of Civil 
Registry records is located. In theory, constituents have 
the right to transfer their Electoral Locality from one 
                                                     
12 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 8 and 10. 
13 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 11 and 12. 
14 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 13 and 14. 
Electoral District to another within the Governorate or 
from one Governorate to another in accordance with any 
identity card or trade union card or document issued by 
an official entity.  However, they must prove that they 
have spent at least two years residing in the location to 
which they wish to transfer their Electoral Locality. (Art. 
59) 
3.4   Electoral Processes 
After the conclusion of voting, the Election Centre 
Committee begins to open the ballot boxes in public and 
count the envelopes contained in the same centre. 
Afterwards, Every Committee shall submit a record to the 
Branch Committee including the names of the Candidate 
and the number of votes each obtained. 
Upon receiving the Committee records, the Branch 
Committee supervises the tallying of the Election results 
in all Electoral District Centres. Then it submits its report 
to the High Judicial Committee, which in turn reviews the 
reports and share the results with the Ministry of Interior 
and the Ministry of Local Administration.  
Candidates in each sector are ranked according to the 
number of valid votes each received. The top Candidates 
from each sector according to the number of seats 
allocated for it shall be considered the winners in the 
Elections. 
The Branch Committees announces the final Election 
results for membership of Local Administration Councils. 
Afterwards, The President issues a decree naming the 
winners of membership Provincial Councils and 
Provincial centre cities. The Minister of Local 
Administration issue a decision naming the winners of 
members of remaining Local Administration Councils16. 
4 The Reality on the Ground  
 What we have highlighted so far is merely a general 
description of what the legal and administrative 
framework which governs Syria’s local relations should 
look like based on various Syrian laws. However, the 
application on the ground is very different from the 
written texts, which have often been “ink on paper”.  
The reality of the Syrian civil war imposed new local 
dynamics, some of which conformed to the 
administrative laws governing the work of the state 
institutions, while others created entirely new systems of 
governance driven by political agendas and local 
mechanisms different from those stipulated in the Syrian 
laws.  
 
15 Law No. 5 / 2014, Art. 15 and 16. 
16 Law No. 5 / 2014, Articles: 74, 75, 79, 80 and 81. 
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As we mentioned earlier in the introduction, it is almost 
impossible to present any future vision of post-conflict 
Syria, particularly with regard to the governance of local 
elections, without considering what is written in the legal 
texts and comparing them with the actual application on 
the ground. This approach gives us the opportunity to 
form a basic conceptualisation of the roadmap which 
could lead the country towards the establishment of local 
electoral procedures that will contribute to a stable 
political transition capable of restoring the existing social 
divide.  
 
Accordingly, and given the complexity of the political, 
military and administrative landscape of the Syrian 
conflict, and for the research necessities related to the 
general objective of this paper, we’ve divided Syria into 
three different administrative regions, based on the 
dynamics of governance structures in each of these 
regions; the government-controlled areas, the opposition-
controlled areas and the PYD-controlled areas. In the 
following sections, we will examine the local structures, 
governing laws and electoral realities in each of the 
aforementioned area of influence.  
4.1   The Government-controlled Areas  
 
The central government in Damascus has noticeably 
failed to implement the new local administration law. As 
a result, there were no real tangible changes to the already 
existing local structures under its control. These 
structures continued to operate in accordance with the 
previous laws, Law No. 15 for 1971, without any 
significant changes in their functions, services, powers, 
responsibilities and relations between them on the one 
hand, and with the “Centre” on the other hand.  
 
The failure of the central government to impose its own 
administrative law can be attributed to two main reasons. 
First, the lack of a real political desire to apply any form of 
decentralisation in its areas of control, for fear of 
weakening the centrality of the political power of 
Damascus at the expense of localities, especially the 
geographically distant ones, and thereby reducing its 
ability to manage the crisis.  
Secondly, due to administrative problems and 
ambiguities related to the law itself. Although the law 
gives a general definition of administrative 
decentralisation, however, it failed to provide the proper 
executive procedures to implement such a concept. For 
instance, the detailed arrangements, adjustments and the 
necessary regulations required to transform the power 
and functions of the relevant ministries and other central 
authorities to the local councils should’ve been provided 
by the National Decentralisation Plan (NDP). The newly 
introduced High Council of Local Administration was 
tasked to develop this plan in collaboration with the 
relevant ministries and oversee the transformation of 
these functions to the councils within a period of six 
                                                     
17 Law 107. Articles 3 and 6 
months after the issuance of the law17. The High Council 
and the NDP, however, have not been created yet. 
Therefore, the additional responsibilities and the relatively 
larger margin of authority over the aforementioned 
sectors have not been identified nor transformed. 
Similarly, the Law of Local Elections has not been 
enforced or executed in all of the areas under government 
control. LACs which were elected before 2011, based on 
the old local electoral law, have continued to operate with 
the same mechanisms and with nearly the same people 
until now. Where the President benefited from the broad 
powers granted to him by the law of local administration, 
in particular, the ability to extend the term of LACs’ 
executive offices almost indefinitely.  
 
Perhaps the only changes that took place after 2011, were 
the appointment of a number of new governors in some 
of the main provinces, such as Homs, Damascus and 
Suwayda. In addition to reducing the security and judicial 
powers stipulated for the governor, and granting these 
powers to the heads of the most prominent intelligence 
agencies in each province, through the formation of what 
is known as the “Quadripartite Committee”, which 
includes the governor, the head of the Political 
Intelligence Branch, the head of Military Intelligence 
branch, and head of the branch of Air Force Intelligence.  
 
This “Quadripartite Committee”, together with a network 
of local businessmen, warlords and tribal leaders 
constitute the main local force in any Damascus-
controlled area, thus marginalising any potential role of 
local councils to have any real and effective role in the 
management of the local affairs of its regions, which were 
largely limited to providing some municipal services such 
as waste management, rubble removal and street 
lighting.  
4.2   The Opposition-controlled Areas  
The highly fragmented nature of the Syrian conflict, 
socially, military and, perhaps most importantly, 
geographically, in terms of the vast geographical distance 
between the areas controlled by the opposition forces, 
and the lack of real “physical” contact between most of 
these areas, in addition to the failure of the Syrian 
opposition to establish an effective, unified and 
centralised administrative body, have played a major role 
in giving  the local councils a considerable and special 
attention from the opposition forces. For them, it was the 
only feasible way to extend their control and create de 
facto authorities that could increase their level of 
legitimacy over their controlled territories. It was an 
obvious and strategic choice for the opposition to rely on 
LACs to demonstrate their governance-related abilities in 
order to gain the required social acceptance amongst the 
local communities.  
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Over the course of 2012, the first generation of LACs has 
succeeded to be perceived as the main body for basic 
service delivery, such as water, electricity and bread, 
besides being a key coordinating actor between the 
evolving relief-based grassroots organisations. Which 
prompted the Syrian political opposition, namely the 
Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), to incorporate LACs 
within its body and to endorse them as its main governing 
entities at the local level (Gharibah, 2017).  
Nonetheless, and despite the level of communication 
between the geographically adjacent councils, a holistic 
governance approach over the opposition-held areas was 
absent. Therefore, in early 2013, several SOC-led 
attempts to organise these councils by establishing legal 
and institutional standards for their work have occurred. 
The establishment of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) 
in March 2013, as the administrative and executive body 
of the SOC, has facilitated these attempts through its 
Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA). 
Shortly after its establishment, SIG has adopted the 
Syrian Law of Local Administration (Law 107) as a 
baseline of its institutional and regulatory framework.  
However, SIG has also introduced several modifications 
to the body of the original law in an attempt to expand the 
principles of decentralisation and to make it a slightly 
more flexible to address the continuous changes of the 
security situation in opposition-held Syria. The main 
modifications in SIG’s version of Law 107 – SIG’s 
Regulatory Frameworks for Local Administration – could 
be summarised as follows:  
 Abolishing the position of Governors and delegating all of 
his/her powers and responsibilities to the elected head of 
the provincial council (except Governor’s security 
mandate which was delegated to the Prime Minister of 
SIG) 
 Changing the electoral processes (more on that in the 
next section) to be more compatible with newly emerged 
social norms 
 Introducing a fixed number of local councils’ members at 
the town and township levels  
 Increasing the planning and monitoring responsibilities of 
LACs and the neighbourhood committees (which is not 
an official administrative unit with a legal personality)   
 Eliminating the Governorates' sub-divisions (Districts and 
Sub-districts), which are mainly related to the ministry of 
interior with judicial and security mandates, and reported 
directly to the governor.  
Electoral Procedures:  
Between 2012 - 2013, most of LACs were formed based 
on a consensus between influential “revolutionary” 
actors, local activists, armed groups, notables, tribal 
leaders and traditional families. However, since late 2014, 
several key councils, mainly Provincial Councils (PCs) 
and strategic City Councils (CCs), like the City Councils of 
Aleppo, Idlib, Ma’aret al-Nouman, Saraqeb and Douma, 
have had several indirect elections following SIG’s 
modified electoral processes. These indirect elections, 
however, were exceptional cases and not the general 
norm, which continued to be based on the consensus of 
local forces, particularly military and religious ones 
(Gharibah, 2017). 
In spite of all efforts to unify the laws governing local 
elections in the opposition areas, the arbitrary nature has 
remained the predominant theme of the formation of 
these local governance bodies. In the following 
paragraphs, we will highlight the most important 
"organised" electoral procedures in these areas. 
“In spite of all efforts to unify the laws 
governing local elections in the 
opposition areas, the arbitrary nature 
has remained the predominant theme 





Based on SIG’s Regulatory Frameworks for Local 
Administration, most of the Provincial Elections were 
conducted as follows: 
 Each province constitutes of several Electoral Districts 
based on the number of population living in each district 
(SIG’s population data are also based on the Law No. 
1378 / 2011). Every year, three months before the end of 
PCs’ terms, The Minister of Local Administration issues a 
decision determining the number of these Electoral 
Districts. The number and the geographical boundaries of 
each district may differ from one term to another based 
on the security situation and based on who is controlling 
the area. 
 For each Electoral District, an Electoral Body is formed in 
each administrative unit in that District. Electoral Bodies 
are proportional to the number of population of each 
administrative unit (1 member in the Electoral Body for 
every 10,000 people, provided that the number of 
members of the Electoral Body shall not be less than one 
person per administrative unit). For instance, the city of 
Busra al-Sham in the province of Dera’a has 33,253 
people, therefore, it has 3 members/representatives in the 
Electoral Body.   
 The local council in each administrative unit is 
responsible for receiving nominations and supervising 
the elections of the members of the unit’s Electoral Body  
 All Electoral Bodies in all Electoral Districts constitute the 
Provincial Electoral Body, (PEB). For instance, the 
province of Dera’a (1,125,593 people) has 7 Electoral 
Districts and 123 members in its PEB.  
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 Provincial Electoral Bodies then (s)elect Provincial 
Council members, which in turn (s)elect the head of the 
PC.  
 Also, based on the Minister’s decision, two tripartite 
judicial committees shall be formed: The Election 
Committee and the Appeals Committee. 
 In most cases, areas outside of the opposition control 
have no electoral body. However, it is up for the Minister 
to take that decision. 
 Finally, the (s)elected members of PC are publicly 
announced, afterwards, they select the members of the 
executive committees. 
Local Elections for the rest of Administrative Units:  
 
The Syrian opposition, especially the political one, has 
always been more concerned with the provincial council 
elections than the other local elections, and these 
elections have always received the most attention at the 
expense of other local elections. This can be attributed to 
three main reasons: 
 The failure of the Syrian opposition to create a central 
judicial and administrative authority across all the areas 
they are controlling, which forced it to resort to the 
division of power provincially by relying on PCs to create 
semi-central structures to be administratively linked with 
it. 
 The lack of financial and human resources to hold local 
elections in all the administrative units which are 
controlled by the opposition. 
 The dominance of the armed factions over a large number 
of councils in the other administrative units, and the non-
recognition of these factions of the legitimacy of the 
Syrian opposition, specifically SIG. 
 
Depending on the above, local elections for the rest of the 
administrative units can be described as follows: 
 
 No clear policies and procedures for the elections of city, 
town and township councils.  
 Ad hoc basis, different from one area to another  
 These elections are, in theory, organised and supervised 
by PCs. However, in reality, PCs have a very limited role in 
these elections 
 They follow indirect election methods using Electoral 
Bodies for each administrative unit. These bodies are 
generally formed by local activists, tribal and community 
leaders, traditional families and representative of 
influential local NGOs and CSOs.  
 
It is worth mentioning that several cases of direct 
elections have occurred over the past couple of years; 
Zamalka, Saqba and the City of Idlib. However, in almost 
all of these cases, the election centres were 
systematically targeted by warplanes and barrel bombs 
resulting in injuries and even deaths of civilians. The high 
risk of organising general direct elections has postponed 
additional attempts in Eastern Ghouta and Dera’a to 
follow these methods. 
 
 
Main Challenges:  
 
In spite of the positive developments of LACs over the 
past five years; they are still facing a lot of obstacles and 
shortcomings due to numerous factors, such as: 
 
1. International actor’s Influence: the SIG has failed to 
become a sustained and continuous conduit for financial 
and administrative support to LACs, since a lot of its state 
and non-state backers, mainly Qatar, Turkey and the U.S, 
have drastically decreased their funding to the opposition 
in general. As a result, its enforcement mechanisms over 
LACs have become largely marginalised over the years at 
the expense of the expanding influence of international 
actors over them. International donors and their Syrian 
and non-Syrian implementers and agencies, which are the 
main source of funding and support for all the various 
services in the opposition-held areas, remained almost as 
the sole driver of the situation. Their different agendas 
have shaped the priorities of LACs and transformed them 
into more donor-based rather needs-based strategies. 
Moreover, international donor’s policies do not usually 
comply with SIG’s regulations and standards, which, in 
turn, have deepened the differences between the LACs’ 
administrative layers - the provincial and local levels. 
Thus weakening the LACs’ administrative structures and 
hierarchy and creating a conflict in the distribution of 
roles and responsibilities between PCs, CCs and sub-local 
councils (towns and villages councils).  
 
2. The influence of armed groups: in most cases, LACs have 
a relatively good level of coordination with moderate 
armed groups located within their areas. Whereas LACs 
are responsible for services provision to the public, these 
armed actors have the actual power of enforcement. 
However, in some cases, these groups try to push their 
own agendas, one way or another, and to influence the 
decision-making process of LACs, but their usual method 
to achieve their purposes is done through their 
representatives or close allies within the body of these 
councils. The Islamic armed fractions, on the other hand, 
have always tried to create their own service provision 
bodies, as alternative structures to LACs, whether to gain 
legitimacy and social acceptance or to have the ultimate 
control over a specific area.  And, in several occasions, 
these fractions tried to minimise the authority of LACs 
and even to dismantle them by deliberately attacking their 
offices or targeting their elected members.  
 
3. Local competition: since all the services are externally 
funded through international donors, the emerging Syrian 
NGOs, the main recipients of such funds, have grown in 
number and power. Currently, they are the main source for 
providing services in the opposition-held areas. Especially 
since they have stronger institutional capacities and 
technical competencies; are more resourceful; and with 
visible access to the international communities in 
comparison to LACs, which made the latter less 
influential and even irrelevant is some sectors, such as 
health and education. 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4. Public perception: LAC's lack of inclusiveness, 
transparency, social accountability and participatory 
mechanisms, created a gap between them and their 
targeted constituencies. Therefore, the public is 
constantly criticising LACs, which are failing to address 
the increasingly urgent needs of their communities, as the 
humanitarian and security situation is continuously 
deteriorating.  
4.3   The PYD-controlled Areas 
 
In late 2012, following the withdrawal of Syrian regime 
from vast territories in the north, the Democratic Union 
Party (PYD) dominated region of northeast Syria has 
gradually gained a relative autonomy. The full extent of 
such an autonomous “state”, however, was realised in 
November 2013, when the PYD, the dominant Kurdish 
political arm, announced its Rojava (West Kurdistan) 
project - the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. 
Driven by the long desire for self-determination, and 
taking advantage of the governance vacuum in the 
provinces of Qamishli, al-Hasakah and the northern 
countryside of Aleppo’s province, where the regime’s 
aerial strikes and heavy bombardments were 
considerably less violent in comparison to the provinces 
of Idlib, Homs, Dera’a and Rural Damascus (Khalaf, 2016).  
 
Similar to the rest of armed insurgencies in Syria, the PYD 
relentlessly aimed at gaining the required legitimacy, 
inside the country and abroad, by demonstrating an 
inclusive governance system, providing services and 
security, coordinating and building military alliances with 
different parties, and tuning the international media 
narrative to its advantage by relying on network of allies 
and supporters in the region and across Europe (Sary, 
2016).  
The PYD has also proven its ability to govern by 
establishing a seemingly robust governance system; the 
PYD’s de facto autonomous federation - Rojava, which 
incorporated three self-governing cantons; Jazira (the 
provinces of Qamishli and al-Hasaka), Kobani and Efrin 
(main districts of the northern and western countryside of 
the province of Aleppo). And since 2016, PYD has also 
claimed several adjacent territories, like the Arab-majority 
towns of al-Raqqa’s countryside, as part of its Rojava 
project. These areas were either recaptured from ISIS or 
being handed over by the Syrian regime (Khalaf, 2016).  
 
Rojava adapts a decentralised system, consisting of 
different administrative layers; each canton includes 
several city councils, which, in turn, are made up of 
neighbourhood/district councils which represent the 
local communes (the lowest administrative level); a 
collection of tens or hundreds of households. Each layer 
has co-presidents and a number of ad hoc committees 
and councils. The two co-presidents of each commune 
                                                     
18 Rojava’s Communes and Councils. Blog. Available at: 
http://www.biehlonbookchin.com/rojavas-communes-and-
councils (Accessed on 9/6/2018). 
19 US-Backed YPG Kurds Are Ethnically Cleansing Arabs From 
Raqqa, and the World Is Silent. Global Research. Available at: 
are gathered in what is called the people's assembly or 
council of the district/neighbourhood in addition to 
elected members from the communes. The number of the 
people’s assemblies’ members depend on the overall 
population of each district. And each layer delegates 
representatives to the councils/assemblies of the higher 
administrative layer18.  
 
Cantons, the highest administrative layer, are designed to 
enjoy an administrative autonomy. They are supposedly 
responsible for providing services, in addition to another 
legal, economic and, perhaps most importantly, self-
defence functions through Rojava's security forces, the 
Asayesh, which act as the local law enforcement and 
border guards (Sary, 2016).  
 
PYD's model of cantonal-governance claims to adopt a 
different value system than the rest of governance 
"islands" of Syria; a system where secularism, 
inclusiveness of all ethical groups, gender equality, and 
localised power are the pillars and drivers of change, at 
least theoretically.  
 
In practice, however, the political and decision-making 
powers are strictly tied to PYD’s top leaders, leaving the 
people’s assemblies and communes’ representatives 
with cosmetic power over services provision (Khalaf, 
2016). Moreover, several reports have suggested a 
systematic practice of discriminatory acts against Arab 
Sunnies in several Arab-majority towns in al-Raqqa’s 
countryside and Manbij, where male residents are forced 
to join the YPG, the People’s Protection Units – PYD’s 
military branch, and, in some cases, the Asayesh forces 
have reportedly prevented Arab families, specially men, 
from returning to their original villages after “liberating” 
them from IS under the pretext that most Arab men from 
these areas are whether extremist fighters or IS 
enthusiasts19. Moreover, many children have been 
recruited to fight with YPG affiliated groups, in addition to 
the continuous unlawful detentions of Arab and non-PYD 
Kurdish activists and community leaders by the Asayesh 
(Amnesty, 2017).  
5 Suggestions and Recommendations  
5.1   Electoral and Administrative Divisions 
Syria’s administrative divisions, and subsequently the 
number of Electoral Districts, LACs’ elected councillors 
and their corresponding responsibilities, are entirely 
based on Civil Registries provided by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics. The last general census was conducted in 
200420, therefore the population data of this census, upon 
which the administrative distribution of 2011 was based, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-backed-kurds-are-ethnically-
cleansing-arabs-from-raqqa-and-the-world-is-silent/5595067. 
(Accessed on 9/6/2018). 
20 http://www.cbssyr.sy/index-EN.htm 
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is outdated. In order to overcome this issue, we suggest 
the following steps: 
1. An updated general census should be conducted in 
accordance to UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs standards mentioned in the “Principles and 
Recommendations for Population and Housing Census – 
Revision 2”. The census should be implemented by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with UN 
Agencies and supervised by international and Syrian 
CSOs.  
2. The population data should not only be based on Civil 
Registries; it should also take into account residents of 
administrative units who have been living there for at 
least two consecutive years since 2011. 
Moreover, as for the Electoral Divisions. All Syrian 
electoral laws, whether in the area controlled by the 
central government or the opposition, relied on the 
administrative divisions defined in the local 
administration law. This dependence will necessarily 
create a situation of imbalances in terms of 
representation, especially in the areas where the 
population has been forcibly evacuated. Therefore, the 
electoral division must be at the neighbourhood level 
within each administrative unit, regardless of its 
definition. Increasing constituencies by making them at 
the neighbourhood-level will increase community 
participation in all local elections and will ensure that 
more people are nominated and represented.  
5.2   Voting Rights for IDPs 
Voting rights for constituents in Syria is based on their 
Electoral Localities, and since these Localities are entirely 
associated with Civil Registries – which are, in turn, 
mostly derived from birth registrations - that means only 
citizens who are officially registered in the Civil Registry 
records of their administrative unit are eligible to vote for 
its council.  
Even though Syria’s Civil Registry law allowed citizens to 
reallocate their Civil Registry records to their permanent 
place of residence, the electoral law applied a mandatory 
term of two years since the reallocation of such records 
in order for these citizens to be able to vote or stand as 
candidates. However, in reality, in order for a person to 
reallocate its record, he/she will need a security 
permission from the General Intelligence Agency, which 
is nearly impossible to obtain. 
Moreover, in order to participate in local elections, a 
person should be physically present at his/her 
hometown’s Election Centre during the elections period. 
As a result, permanent or temporary residents, and, 
perhaps most importantly, IDPs who are unable to safely 
return to their original place of residence, will be deprived 
of their right to freely participate in local elections. 
IDPs are entitled to the same set of rights as non-
displaced citizens, which include the right to political 
participation and representation. The 
disenfranchisement of IDPs deepens the social, political 
and economic marginalisation that they typically face.  It 
denies them of the ability to influence the decisions that 
are directly affecting their lives and thereby to direct their 
local councils and the state’s national policies to 
effectively address their pressing issues. 
Therefore, the post-agreement election law should amend 
the definition of the Electoral Localities to include 
permanent or temporary residents. Consequently, 
Candidates and Voters Registrations should be also 
associated with a person's place of residency or domicile. 
Additionally, a minimum durational residency 
requirement, like 12 consecutive months, should be 
imposed as a precondition to local elections. In that case, 
citizens living on Syrian soil will have three choices: a) to 
freely select to physically cast their ballots in their original 
hometowns, if that wouldn’t impose any sort of security 
threats on them, b) to vote for the local council of their 
current place of residence, without affecting their right to 
return or their legal IDP status, or c) to introduce the right 
of “absentee voting”, where any citizen could vote for the 
local council of his/her hometown (original residence) 
without having to be physically present there.  
5.3   Voting Rights for Refugees  
Law No. 5 / 2014 grants the right to vote for “Syrians not 
residing on Syrian territory” only for the presidential 
elections (Art. 99). The law also prohibits any form of 
voting by proxy (Art. 3). Which means that the Syrian 
diaspora and the additional 5,6 million Syrian refugees 
who fled the country after 2011 are not able to participate 
in local (or parliamentary) elections.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
stipulates in Article 21 that “everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives”. 
Therefore, Syrian citizens who are living outside of Syria, 
and regardless of their refugee or asylum status in their 
host countries, may delegate their voting power to a 
representative inside the country, whether this 
representative is a first-degree relative or any person with 
a written legal delegation.  
“the Syrian diaspora and the 
additional 5,6 million Syrian refugees 
who fled the country after 2011 are 
not able to participate in local (or 
parliamentary) elections.” 
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5.4   Sectorial-based Elections  
 
As mentioned before, the percentage of representatives 
from Sector A (Workers and Farmers) shall be at least 
50% of all elected members of LACs. The law also grants 
the Minister of Local Administration with the power to 
determine how many reserved seats from Sector A 
should be allocated in each council, without any further 
specifications on the mechanisms of this allocation. 
Throughout the years, since the Ba’ath Party’s rise to 
power during the March 1963 coup, the Party was 
determined to organise the results in a way that would 
allow it to maintain full legislative and administrative 
power, alongside its hold on the executive branch, by 
allotting half of all seats in LACs to candidates from 
within its ranks, under the banner of "seats reserved for 
workers and farmers." The same technique was applied 
to the election lists for the parliament, and even for 
industrial and commercial chambers of commerce. A 
complex localised network of tribal leaders and small 
businessmen who are loyal to al-Ba’ath Party would be 
placed on predetermined lists of workers and farmers, 
thus preventing the rise of any group that might be 
deemed disloyal to the Party.  
 
These sectorial divisions should be eliminated from the 
law of elections (at all levels) to prevent any attempt in 
manipulating the results and to create a more 
competitive, democratic and participatory electoral 
system.  
5.5   Women Representation 
Besides the quotas reserved for “workers and farmers”, 
the Syrian Law of General Elections has neglected to 
allocate any kind of gender quotas for public elections. In 
an assessment conducted by Local Administration 
Councils Unit (LACU) in 2015 on women participation in 
opposition-held LACs, the percentage was less than 1.7% 
of all (s)elected members. Therefore, any attempt to 
reform the regulatory framework of local elections should 
include a women quota in order to politically empower 
women in the public sphere. The suggested quota system 
should aim at ensuring that women constitute a “critical 
minority” of at least 35% of all LACs members. This could 
be achieved through:  
a) Introducing an electoral gender quota regulation which 
requires at least 40% of the candidates on the electoral 
lists are women (a compulsory party quota in all 
elections), and/or  
b) Imposing quotas (30%) as reserved seats for women in 
all LACs (and other elected bodies).  
5.6   Roles of Governors and LACs 
Governors are appointed and discharged by a presidential 
decree as the heads of the elected PCs. They are the 
highest representatives of the Executive/Central 
Authority, which grant them with the capacity “to oversee 
the work of Local Councils and all Local and Central 
Agencies in the Governorate” (Law 107. Art: 39, 40 and 
41). Furthermore, Governors have political, legislative, 
judicial and security mandates. Authorised by the 
Executive Authority, they have the power to take all 
necessary measures to consolidate public security, 
implement and safeguard rules of constitutional public 
freedoms, in addition, to carry out the duties of judicial 
police where appropriate (Law 107, Art. 40). Article 52 of 
Law 107 clearly states that: "The internal security forces 
in the Governorate shall implement the orders of the 
Governor … If the Governor deems that the internal 
security forces present in the Governorate are insufficient 
to ensure public security, he may request the use of Army 
forces”. The role of the elected members of PCs, 
including the newly established position of the President 
of Provincial Council, over these security or judicial 
sectors is totally absent. To that end, the law states that 
in the event that the Governor is discharged or is absent, 
the head of the Governorate police shall deputise him in 
his capacity as a representative of the executive authority 
(Law 107, Art. 55).  
The law also granted Governors with a legal impunity for 
their actions during service; only the High Judicial Council 
(which is headed by the President) has the authority to 
persecute the Governor and only after he is transferred to 
it by a presidential decree. Public or civil actions could not 
be taken against him except by decision from the High 
Judicial Council (Law 107, Art. 56).  
The concentration of administrative, fiscal, judicial and 
security powers in the hands of Damascus-appointed 
Governors weakens the constituents’ incentives in 
actively engaging with local councils’ elections, thus 
leading to “rubber stamp elections” where elected 
councillors are systematically marginalised with no 
significant decision-making powers. Therefore, 
Governors should be directly elected from their 
communities in order to obtain the required legitimacy 
and to be accountable in front of their constituents, which 
will inevitably lead to an actual and effective 
decentralised governance system.  
5.7 Elections Observation and Administration  
For over 40 years, Syria’s elections have been largely 
described as coercive and sham elections, predetermined 
by Ba’athist Party leaders and high-rank intelligence 
officers in Damascus (Syrian Expert House, 2013). 
Therefore, administering nation-wide post-conflict local 
elections within a deeply fragmented and polarised Syrian 
community, where public trust in state’s apparatus, 
especially the legal and judicial institutions, is entirely 
demolished, would require immense and exceptional 
efforts from the international community to build public 
confidence in the honesty of electoral system (UN-
Women, 2005), help to deter coercion and intimidation 
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and enhance the legitimacy of the LACs that emerge from 
elections.  
In order to achieve the aforementioned goals, 
International election observation missions, such as 
European Union Election Observation Missions (EU 
EOMs), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), or any similar UN-mandated international 
observation missions, should be mobilised and equipped 
with a full mandate to be directly involved in every 
element of the electoral processes; the formation and 
membership of all judicial committees: The High 
Elections Committee (headed by an International Chief 
Observer), Appeals Committees, Branch Committees and 
Election Centre Committees. Additionally, these 
international missions should spare no effort in 
encouraging domestic groups, such as Syrian CSOs and 
CBOs, to actively participate in the observation process. 
However, since most of these local organisations do not 
have sufficient knowledge or resources to organise 
effective monitoring efforts; building the capacity of 
Syrian local observers in the international standards of 
election observations should be a priority for any 
observation mission in Syria.  
5.8   External Armed Actors   
 
The warring parties in Syria gradually realised the 
importance of demonstrating an effective governance 
system within their areas of influence as an essential tool 
in imposing authority and obtaining social acceptance or 
legitimacy amongst local communities, and also to be 
able to allocate material and human resources to 
maintain their power and ability to fight. Different 
authorities had very different models of governance and 
different ways of exercising power. As a result, different 
governance structures emerged in different areas. The 
variations are explained by the type of dominant 
influential power, the nature of the external interventions 
by international and regional supporters and the internal 
socio-political dynamics and local context.  
 
As we have noted in our analysis of what is actually 
happening on the ground regarding local elections in the 
various areas of control over the Syrian territory; there are 
several common characteristics that can be derived from 
all these experiences. The most important of which is the 
involvement of armed groups, regardless of their political, 
ethnic and religious affiliations, in the formation of local 
governance bodies and the selection of their members in 
the areas under their control. This effect of the armed 
factions has two main forms: 
 
First, a direct intervention in the formation of local 
structures, either through the formation of a service 
council directly affiliated with the military faction (most 
common in the case of Islamic factions, especially the 
extremist ones). Or through an unofficially declared quota 
guaranteeing the presence of civilian figures close to a 
specific military faction within the elected body of the 
local council. In some cases, this intervention has been 
illustrated by restricting the work and functions of the 
local council through linking it to religious-based judicial 
bodies, such as Shari’a Courts, which were directly 
affiliated with or formed by a specific armed group or 
militia. These courts had directly supervised the electoral 
process and exercised a total oversight over all services 
implemented by the council. This form of influence is 
considerably more common in the areas outside of 
government control (the opposition and PYD-controlled 
areas).  
 
Second, an indirect intervention in the formation of local 
councils, particularly those located in areas controlled by 
the Syrian government. Since these councils have not 
been subject to any real local elections since 2011, and 
there has been no real change in their basic structure, pro-
government armed groups, together with the intelligence 
branches and a complex network of warlords and local 
businessmen have marginalised the work of these 
councils by dominating all services provided in most 
crucial sectors.  
 
Therefore, the success of any post-agreement electoral 
process must address the issue of the involvement of 
armed factions and informal local networks, such as tribal 
leaders and religious figures, in order to preserve the 
integrity of these elections and the legitimacy of the newly 
emerged elected councils. This can be achieved by 
implementing the following actions in the pre-election 
phase: 
 
1. Stabilising local communities by implementing a 
comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration activities, in addition to Security Sector 
reforms. These activities and reforms should be seen as 
necessary and urgent preconditions for any attempt to 
organise a nation-wide local election.   
2. To neutralise all those who take up arms from any direct 
political involvement, particularly with regard to their 
candidacy for any official position in the elected local 
councils (or any other official entity), while retaining, of 
course, all other civil rights, especially with regard to the 
right to vote. The time period for such neutralisation 
should be five years from the moment a political 
agreement is reached. 
3. To take all the necessary measures to prevent any source 
of electoral violence, by imposing strict standards on 
political behaviour and campaign tactics, in addition to 
proposing sanctions for non-compliance. 
4. Supporting community-based organisations to exercise 
their social control role in relation to the entire electoral 
process, including monitoring the eligibility of candidates 
for any official position according to the general rules 
governing local elections. 
5.9   Timeframe  
 
The question of the time needed to start the electoral 
process at the local level is one of the most complex 
questions related to the elections, especially in countries 
emerging from a nation-wide destructive civil war like 
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Syria, which has an added burden of carrying a gruesome 
legacy of tyranny and repression. 
 
On one hand, local elections play a key role in the early 
recovery of local communities; giving them a sense of 
ownership over the political agreement and an important 
motive for its success at the local level. Particularly if the 
state succeeds in holding fair and representative 
elections for local councils. In addition to the positive 
impact of these elections on the post-agreement 
reconstruction phase and the reactivation of basic 
services across all sectors, such as health, education, 
agriculture and others. 
 
However, on the other hand, there are several crucial 
preconditions that should be thoroughly addressed in the 
pre-election phase in order to prepare the appropriate 
climate to hold such elections without compromising 
their integrity. Such preconditions are constitutional and 
legal amendments that ensure the fullest possible 
functioning of the electoral process, the creation of 
judicial mechanisms for the administration and 
monitoring of elections, the achievement of social 
cohesion – as much as possible -, protection 
mechanisms for refugees, returnees and displaced 
persons. In addition to creating a regulatory and legal 
framework that achieves decentralisation and gives 
elected local councils real powers and responsibilities in 
order to enable them to manage their local affairs and 
rehabilitate their societies. 
 
As a result, speeding up any electoral process at the local 
level will necessarily lead to distorted results that would 
abort any real political impact in the future. Especially 
since the political structures required to exercise free 
electoral processes are not yet available. Accordingly, we 
propose that local elections in Syria can only be held (or 
be of any relevance) only after all the aforementioned 
preconditions have been fulfilled, but without exceeding 
more than four years since the date of the implementation 






































17          Local Elections in Post-Agreement in Syria, December 2018  
Bibliography 
 
Amnesty International Report 2017.  
 
Gharibah, M., Bahjat, H., Hilal, L., von Burg, C., Sharbaji, M., 
and Santschi, M. (2017). Perception of Governance: The 
experience of Local Administrative Councils in Opposition-
held Syria. SwissPeace and LACU. 
 
Hinnebusch, R. 2012. Syria: from “authoritarian upgrading” 
to revolution?. International Affairs.  
 
Jokay, C. 2001. Local Government and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Open Society Institute.  
 
Khaddour, K. 2017. Local Wars and the Chance for 
Decentralized Peace in Syria. Carnegie Middle East 
Center.   
 
Khalaf, R. 2016. Governing Rojava: Layers of Legitimacy in 
Syria. Chatham House.  
 
Lopez-Pintor, R. 2005. Post Conflict Elections and 
Democratization: An Experience Overview. USAID.  
 
Sary, G. 2016. Kurdish Self-Governance in Syria: Survival 
and Ambition. Chatham House.  
 
Shujaat, A. Roberts, H. and Erben, P. 2016. Internally 
Displaced Persons and Electoral Participation: A Brief 
Overview. IFES.  
 
Syrian Expert House 2013.  Syrian Transition Roadmap.  
 
UN-Women 2005. Women & Elections, Guide to Promoting 























Find out more about the  
Conflict Research Programme 
 
Connaught House 
The London School of Economics  
and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
Contact: 
Anna Mkhitaryan, Programme Manager 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631 
Email: Intdev.Crp@lse.ac.uk 
 
lse.ac.uk/conflict 
